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Abstract: This article presents a long overdue analysis of the idea of an ethically 
committed social science, which, after the demise of positivism and the deeming of 
moral neutrality as impossible, has come to dominate the self-understanding of many 
contemporary sociological approaches. Once adequately specified, however, the idea is 
shown to be ethically questionable in that it works against the moral commitments 
constitutive of academic life. The argument is conducted with resources from the work 
of Peter Winch, thus establishing its continuing relevance and critical importance for 
the social sciences, sociology in particular. Special reference is made to heretofore 
unappreciated aspects of his work, including within the groundbreaking The Idea of a 
Social Science and its Relation to Philosophy, but focusing specifically on Winch’s 
later contributions to ethics. 
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More than sixty years have passed since the publication of Peter Winch’s classic work, 
The Idea of a Social Science and Its Relation to Philosophy (ISS), a book which has 
since generated a considerable volume of debate (most famously Wilson, 1970). 
Notwithstanding, how deep a challenge the book really presents to the social sciences1 
has not been fully appreciated. Thinking of the book as an anti-positivist treatise, as is 
customary, misses that its challenge is, in fact, independent not only from the kind of 
scientific aspiration that may be at work in sociology, which is the discipline this article 
will focus on, (that is, whether it derives from the philosophy of science of yesteryear 
or is newly minted), but also from the very existence of any scientistic leanings. Even 
sociological programmes that do not draw on renditions of scientific method provided 
by the philosophy of science or, otherwise put, do not see themselves as related to 




nevertheless, equally unwilling to be guided by the book’s central message: to pay close 
attention to the conceptual forms wherein the various kinds of understanding that make 
up social life find expression. A tendency towards illegitimate abstraction and the 
conflation of conceptual and empirical questions are, in truth, not only the prerogative 
of a positivist social science that is no longer; they are deeply entrenched within 
persistently dominant conceptions of what constitutes a sociological problem and what 
constitutes a finding, in sum, what it means to practice theory; what to conduct research.  
 Given that a number of scholars have published work in this journal (Kemp, 
2003; Lukes, 2003; Lynch, 2000; Sivado, 2011) and elsewhere (Hutchinson, Read and 
Sharrock, 2008) that rehearses in detail the arguments of the book, I will mostly refrain 
from repeating them here; I wish, instead, to break new ground. I will, thus, be mainly 
concerned with arguing, not that ISS possesses a relevance which extends beyond the 
one it is usually understood to have, true though I think that to be, but that the relevance 
of Peter Winch’s work extends beyond the topics explicitly dealt with in ISS and 
‘Understanding a Primitive Society’ (1964b), the two pieces by which social scientists 
are most likely to be acquainted with Winch. I will aim to show that his later work on 
ethics, although not directly addressing the social sciences, can nevertheless 
supplement his earlier arguments and have a particularly powerful bearing on recent 
developments in sociology.  
Written in the late 1950s, ISS responded to intellectual tendencies during an era 
when sociology was animated by the vision of turning itself into a genuine science. 
While it would be an exaggeration to declare this vision now dead —informing as it 
does current approaches such as Critical Realism and Analytical Sociology, among 
others— after the 1960s and the, official at least, demise of positivism, a different, 
equally unfulfilled, aspiration has mostly come to substitute itself for that of becoming 
a science: the aspiration of being ethically and politically consequential. Although there 
is nothing particularly novel about this idea, being, for example, as programmatically 
embedded in Marx as explicitly shunned by Weber, it was the former figure’s 
incorporation into the sociological canon after the 1960s which paved the way for the 
dominance this vision enjoys as it feeds into a host of contemporary orientations in 
sociology.  
The aspiration of being ethically and politically consequential is not only the 
historical successor of positivism but is also perceived by many to be its logical 




assumptions, in particular the idea of a morally neutral or value-free sociology. 
According to a typical way of arguing, this idea refers to a mythical creature, in effect 
expressing an impossibility (e.g. Becker, 1967: 239; Gouldner, 1962: 212; 1968: 103; 
1970: 485; cf. Davydova and Sharrock 2003: 373), a fact taken to imply that the only 
realistic alternative to putting up ‘a vain ritual of moral neutrality’ (Gouldner, 1962: 
212) is the pursuit of explicitly value-laden projects.  
Thus, the pendulum has since swung towards projects animated by the idea of 
an inevitably ethically committed social science. Obvious examples of such projects 
are the ‘emancipatory approaches’, such as critical theory (see Fay, 1987; Geuss, 1981), 
the various forms of feminism (e.g. Collins, 2000; Fraser, 2013; Smith, 1981), 
poststructuralism (e.g. Butler, 1990; Laclau and Mouffe, 1985) and postcolonialism 
(see Bhambra, 2016; Go, 2016), but there are also other programmes which are, in part 
or wholly, animated by the idea and thus demonstrate its rather wide reach: ‘a social 
science that matters’ based on the Aristotelian notion of phronesis (prudence or 
practical wisdom) (Flyvberg, 2001), ‘a public sociology’ (Burawoy, 2005) based on 
‘moral commitment’ (Burawoy, 2014) and a sociology aiming at the production of 
‘transformative knowledge’ (Morgan, 2016). In what follows I will set out the idea of, 
what I have dubbed, ‘an ethically committed social science’ in some generality rather 
than discuss versions by particular authors, so it is worth stating clearly at the outset 
that there are potentially important differences that may require further care, which I 
will not be providing here. Nevertheless, I believe that the idea of an ethically 
committed social science is held in common in its basic form, which I will seek to 
reconstruct, and can be discussed as such. However, this is not to say that it is held in 
common by all sociological programmes. Not only are there important national 
differences between sociological traditions, for instance, between the United States and 
Britain, but there are indeed numerous programmes which do not organise their aims 
around this idea, such as Bourdieusian sociology, social network analysis, demography 
and cultural sociology, among others. Nevertheless, it is worth insisting that the idea 
maintains a significant level of disciplinary penetration, including when used as a 
shibboleth among members2 and students.3 
Although a frequently employed type of reasoning understands ethical 
commitment as a matter of necessity, it is worth pointing out that there are other options 
available. To see this consider Martyn Hammersley who, having written extensively on 




Research Political?’ (1995), understanding ‘political’ as referring to power and values 
and, thus, as close to the idea of ethical commitment. Instructive for our purposes, 
besides the potential overlap in topic, are the different senses he understands the 
question to possess. The strongest version amounts to the theoretical question whether 
it even makes sense to suppose that research could ever be anything other than political, 
itself close to the sense of ethical commitment as necessary, as already mentioned. But 
he also singles out, given a negative response to the theoretical question, the empirical 
one whether research is or is not in actual practice and, further, the normative one 
whether it ought or ought not to be political. Returning to ethical commitment, we thus 
end up with the following range of questions: can, is, ought social science to (not) be 
ethically committed?  
In this article I would like to examine, what these questions involve as well as 
the different senses of ‘ethical commitment.’ I will be making use of materials from 
Winch to piece together and defend an original argument towards which he might have 
been sympathetic but which he did not articulate to this degree. As Winch notes in 
Ethics and Action (1972: 1) the fact that we may come to say seemingly inconsistent 
things about a question when we approach it from different angles is instructive. My 
purpose in what follows is to use this fact in order to help us find our feet with the idea. 
To think through these difficult issues, then, my strategy will be to start in the 
following two sections from some aspects of Winch’s work which, either directly or 
when treated by commentators in a certain way, lead us to consider the idea of an 
ethically committed social science as a necessary one and which, thus, work together 
with, rather than against, various sorts of ‘impossibility arguments’. I will consider the 
claims, first, that accuracy and justice demand a commitment to a morally resonant 
vocabulary and, second, that morality is not a contained ‘form of activity’ and, 
therefore, social science cannot choose to remove itself from ethical commitments. I 
will then direct my attention to the idea of an ethically committed social science in order 
to offer a clarification of its structure. This will consist in sketching out three of its basic 
features: commitment by virtue of membership in the discipline, unanimity and 
partisanship. I will, finally, proceed to show, taking into consideration further aspects 
of Winch’s work on ethics, where the idea runs into distinctly moral problems, thus 
also exhibiting what Winch’s response might have been to the idea of an ethically 
committed sociology, which succeeded the idea of a social science, about which he 





Our morally resonant vocabulary is necessary for accurate and just description 
 
Concepts play a constitutive role in social life. This fact bears the implication that 
demands of accuracy bind the descriptions of the social scientist to the conceptual forms 
of the society they are studying (see Tsilipakos, 2020). Winch illustrated this point in 
various ways, including with reference to the economist’s second-order notion of 
liquidity preference, arguing that its validity depends on its being parasitic on 
autochthonous terms such as ‘money’, ‘selling’, ‘assets’ and the concepts they express. 
Being committed to a vocabulary which has a constitutive role comes with yet further 
baggage, especially if that vocabulary is implicated in the moral order that is social life. 
The epigraph to ISS stands as a clear expression of the fact that there are demands of 
justice riding on those of accuracy (cf. Gunnell, 2009). Winch comes back to this in his 
later work. In ‘Particularity and Morals’ he considers the respect due to a person as 
something tied to ‘taking seriously their description of their action, and this is also 
treating them justly or with justice, in treating seriously their understanding of the 
situation and of what the situation calls for them.’ (1987: 177) There are a number of 
senses of injustice here, including that of discarding personal moral dispositions to 
which I will return when discussing the issue of uniform commitment across the 
discipline. For the moment let us look into the injustice of not taking seriously one’s 
description of their action. 
In his introduction to a subsequent edition of ISS, Raimond Gaita (2008), 
folding in his knowledge of Winch’s later work as well as his own concerns on ethics, 
examines the issue of description with reference to the preservation of the ethical 
resonances afforded by a constitutive vocabulary. He invokes an imaginary example of 
a social scientist who in studying, as he puts it, ‘discipline procedures’ for improving 
student conduct in a school, wants to base her description of what the teachers in the 
school are after on a neutral notion of ‘behaviour modification’ while dispensing with 
or perhaps merely overlooking the fact that some teachers might describe these 
proposals as an attempt at bribery, or might object to punishment that relies on the 
involvement of the rest of the student body and which may thus result in the humiliation 
of those punished. Gaita’s point is that opting for the notion of ‘behaviour 
modification’, does not allow an understanding of what ‘bribery’, ‘punishment’ or 




via the following construction: ‘don’t you understand what it means to be humiliated in 
the way children would be if you encouraged their fellow students to disapprove of 
them?’ (2008: xxv). In speaking thus, Gaita is already invoking Winch’s own remarks 
on the sometimes internal relation between being willing to consider (or being 
indifferent to) an action and really understanding what that action means.4 Yet, the 
sense of ‘understanding what it means’ in Gaita’s formulation is not entirely lucid, 
particularly regarding the extent to which it has to do with understanding a form of 
words.  
First, let us try to clarify the matter by thinking of some appropriate replies. For 
example, someone could respond with the following words: ‘Oh, yes, I remember being 
humiliated as a child, If anyone knows I ought to know, I have had that experience and 
I know how unpleasant and demeaning it is’ or ‘Yes, I do understand what it means and 
how bad it can be which is why I see that it is imperative that we do not allow it to 
happen’. But consider the following alternative response: ‘Well, I know what it means, 
I have had the experience and I have seen how useful it is in life, which is precisely 
why I think it will make tough kids out of them’. All of the above are possible moral5 
understandings expressed towards what is happening. They exhibit the intended sense 
of the expression ‘what it means’ in connection with behaving in certain ways and they 
do so in large part through the invocation of one’s personal experience and how it has 
shaped their moral understanding of the situation. 
It can now be appreciated that there are important differences between the 
question ‘what the words “punishment,” “bribery” or “humiliation” mean’ and the 
question ‘what it means to punish, bribe or be humiliated’. When asked in the abstract 
the latter somewhat converges with the former in so far as it relates to seeing that these 
terms are used to describe behaviour to which disvalue can attach. But the questions 
diverge in sense and moral differences emerge when the issue of understanding what 
bribery, humiliation or punishment mean is posed, not in general, but in connection 
with particular cases and one’s relation to them as a person. As we saw, the operative 
sense of ‘understanding what it means’ is that of sharing a set of experiences and a 
moral outlook rather than seeing that, for example, in general, bribery is something to 
be disapproved of, or being competent in the use of the term ‘bribery’. This competence, 
of course, is something presupposed in any further moral discussion. 
 Thus, to return to the crucial aspect of Gaita’s example, since the teachers are 




capture the issue with the term ‘behaviour modification’, apart from importing 
particularly manipulative connotations, shuts down rather than making available or 
deepening in any sense understanding of the problem, the range of possible responses 
and, in particular, what they mean.6 There are moral features inextricably bound with 
the situation and, for Gaita, sticking with the terms ‘bribery’, ‘punishment’ and 
‘humiliation’, and paying attention to the tone with which they are uttered, is necessary 
if those features are to even register for the social scientist.  
Gaita proceeds to argue that we need to understand what is deep or shallow in 
the teachers’ response by employing evaluative or ‘thick concepts’7 that require 
distinguishing between real and counterfeit forms of, say, justice by appeal to art and 
to ‘extraordinary language’ (2008: xxvi-xxvii).8 This, however, seems to run together 
the idea of registering the different distinctions between what is real and counterfeit 
with the idea of being able to settle between conflicting versions of them. In other 
words, Gaita’s words might reasonably be taken as confusing the social scientist’s 
description of the moral options and the quite separate matter of whether she opts, in 
this case, for the view that sees humiliation as an insuperable obstacle or as a minor 
inconvenience on the road to building tougher kids.9 Indeed, both of these views are 
possible, each distributing depth and superficiality differently, and, although 
commitment to a morally resonant vocabulary is necessary for both, it necessitates 
neither.  
Returning to the overarching question of the ethical commitment of social 
science, Winch and, in part, Gaita are arguing in favour of the necessary commitment 
to the vocabulary which is constitutive of social life, if social science is to be accurate 
and just in its descriptions and not lose sight of moral visions that play an integral part 
in social situations.10 We might describe this as a kind of ‘impossibility argument’, one 
ruling out that it might make sense to discard our morally resonant vocabulary in favour 
of some other set of terms, perhaps some kind of neutral ‘observation language’. Yet 
we have seen that no part of this argument implies the necessary commitment of the 
social scientist to a specific moral vision. 
 
Morality as a general ‘form of activity’ 
 
Social life is a moral order, traditionally conceived so in sociology which not only 




‘impossibility considerations’ regarding the idea of an ethically committed social 
science: if there is no way to contain morality, then there is no way for the social 
sciences to be insulated from it and, therefore, they must commit on at least some of its 
demands. 
Let us approach the issue by looking at Winch’s ‘Preface to the Second Edition’ 
(1990) where he casts a retrospective eye on ISS offering clarifications, qualifications 
and elaborating on some of the things he could have done differently. In ISS Winch had 
talked about logic as embedded within activities, and about criteria of intelligibility as 
something pertaining to each activity, while arguing against the intelligibility of 
judgements as to the rationality of, first, entire activities and, second, particular 
stretches of conduct within an activity, for example, praying to God within religious 
life, on the basis of criteria imported from another area of conduct, such as scientific 
experimentation. Winch considered his not paying more attention to the logic-
idealizing flavour of formulations of this kind as responsible for a particularly 
unwelcome implication some read into his discussion, namely, that activities are 
separate and completely isolated from each other.11 In the preface to the second edition 
of the book he is, first of all, eager to complicate the understanding of ‘forms of activity’ 
or ‘modes of social life’ as not all occupying the same footing. In other words, he sees 
these expressions as applying to a more heterogeneous set of categories beyond the 
typical set of, e.g., ‘religion’, ‘science’, art. Moreover, he stresses the possibility of not 
only overlap but, even further, internal relations between them in the sense that in some 
cases ‘one cannot even be intelligibly conceived as existing in isolation from others’ 
(2008: xv). The two issues of the relationship between different activities, on the one 
hand, and of the personal commitments of individuals whose life encompasses these 
activities, on the other, are raised throughout Winch’s work,12 although in the preface 
he specifically points towards the understanding of morality in his essay ‘Nature and 
Convention’, published a year after ISS. This essay will be useful, then, in discussing 
the sense in which the notion of a ‘form of activity’ can apply to morality, as well as 
what it might mean to speak of internal relations between morality and other aspects of 
life.  
In looking into the matter we might first bring to our attention, so as to render 
more explicit, an implicit understanding that is already present in ISS. In Chapter 2 
(2008[1958]: 43), Winch connects the problems of calling into question the entire idea 




Pareto’s tendency to describe entire ‘forms of activity’ or ‘modes of life’, such as 
religion, as illogical. The fact that the notion of a reason for an action is described as a 
form of activity is particularly interesting because it shows that reason-giving and 
religious activity are both vulnerable to the same philosophical misconception, 
independently of any implication as to their insularity. Indeed, the idea of a reason for 
an action and the attending practice of reason-giving are immune against being 
understood in any self-contained way (any more than asking for something, apologising 
or promising can be compartmentalised). Moreover, giving reasons possesses a 
generality of such a kind that makes it perfectly intelligible to assert internal relations, 
e.g., with the practice of science, politics or the law. This broadening of ‘form of 
activity’ provides a platform from which to understand morality, not analogously to 
science but analogously to reason-giving. 
Turning now to ‘Nature and Convention’, Winch is there concerned to criticize 
Popper’s dualism between decisions and facts and to point out that statements of fact 
and decisions, and the relation between them, are characterised by pluralism in ‘science, 
morality, business, law, politics’ (1972: 57), seemingly confirming the unfortunate 
assimilation of morality to this standard categorial group. But he then comes to 
complicate that understanding in interesting ways. First, he notes that the notion of a 
scientific community differs from that of a moral community in that ‘society would not 
be possible without [it]’ (1972: 58). In other words, one could say that scientific 
community implies but is not implied by moral community, which is shown to be 
internally related as a presupposition to scientific activities.13 Winch further notes:  
 
Morality cannot be called, in the same sense as can science a ‘form of activity’; 
it is not something one can choose to engage in or not at will. It would hardly 
make sense, for instance, for someone to say he had spent six weeks working hard 
at morality (unless this meant something like moral philosophy) (1972: 58)  
 
The notion of working hard that might apply to things like giving promises or telling 
the truth, one might add, is not in the sense of working at one’s skills or technique; 
rather what is typically meant is working on or even struggling with oneself in order to 
keep a promise or to tell the truth. Winch goes on to elaborate that it does not make 
sense to suppose that one may choose whether to be involved with moral concerns or 




a lack of sensitivity to them might leave us exposed to criticism. As Winch observes, 
driving home the logical distinction between ‘form of activity’ as applied to morality 
and to science: ‘You cannot put yourself outside the sphere of moral discourse by 
saying it does not interest you. But a man [sic] who refuses to concern himself with 
scientific issues does not thereby expose himself to scientific judgement’ (1972: 59), 
the point being that unlike scientific judgement and its relatively contained relevance 
having to do with technical matters, which allows it to be left to the experts, moral 
judgement is not a self-contained or local aspect of our lives that can be avoided by 
someone professing lack of concern. 
After paying attention to the subtleties around Winch’s understanding of the 
notion of ‘form of activity’ we can appreciate some of the relevant features of morality. 
We saw that it makes no more sense to speak of morality as a separate sphere than it 
makes sense to speak of making promises, deliberating or thinking about one’s conduct 
as constituting a separate sphere. This is not to say that Winch is advocating a 
conception of morality as all-encompassing, which, again, does not seem to make any 
more sense than saying that promising or deliberating are all-encompassing. 
Undoubtedly there is generality present, but the generality of moral concerns exhibits 
itself in the fact that they are intertwined with our various activities, not in somehow 
containing everything that goes on in those activities.14 Moral demands may crop up in 
many different contexts not because these contexts are inside the sphere of morality –
nor are they outside it– but because, one might say, morality is an omnipresent 
dimension of social life. I have stressed the possible analogy between morality and 
reason-giving, which lies not in any idea that morality provides us with reasons for 
acting (1972: 177), but in being a possible dimension of appraisal and having to do with 
the application of standards to what we do. 
In some of his early work, Winch articulates a conception of morality as arising 
from our common life and, as already noted, also presupposed by it. In ‘Nature and 
convention’ he argues that ‘the social conditions of language and rationality must also 
carry with them certain fundamental moral conceptions’ (1972: 60-1), an example 
being that of truthfulness as a moral virtue which, he thought at the time, stands as ‘a 
necessary background condition in any society in which it is possible for anyone to 
make true statements’ (ibid.: 63). He develops this line of thought further in 
‘Understanding a Primitive Society’ (1964b) where he observes that not everything 




notions’, such as birth, death and sexual relations, and that their various accompanying 
conceptions are closely linked to concepts such as good and evil. One should not 
conclude from this that for Winch morality derives from ‘nature’. In ‘Human Nature’, 
published in 1969, he rejects the idea that morality is a way of fulfilling ‘human needs’, 
which would allegedly stand as its criteria, arguing instead that moral dispute is already 
involved in finding out what those needs are. Nor does Winch view favourably the 
subordination of morality to rationality or Kantian universal law. Moreover, Winch 
points out that the fact that people may disagree as to what is and what is not a moral 
issue leads to reflection not only on our shared life together but also, importantly, on 
how a particular person may ‘arrive at a moral understanding of [their] own life.’ (1972: 
3-4), a point which we will have reason to emphasise in connection with the issue of 
disciplinary unanimity.  
All in all, it would be ill-advised to press towards a general definition of 
morality or of what makes a consideration into a ‘moral consideration’. Winch’s 
relevant observations, for example, that moral disgust is such by virtue of its relation 
to concepts such as ‘betrayal, breach of faith, etc.’ (1987: 172) should be understood in 
the context of his explicit statement that there is a ‘very wide variety of situations, 
arguments and judgements to which it is natural to apply the term “moral”’ (1972: 159) 
and, further, that moral judgements are themselves heterogeneous (1987: 185). I would 
add that moral considerations are best understood by paying attention to their 
occasioned character, including their relation to a set of concepts that includes good, 
evil, bad, right and wrong, harm, virtue, integrity and very many others. It is important 
to remember that our final court of appeal is not any definition or theory of morality, 
but the fact that we may or may not be capable of registering and responding to a moral 
outlook (cf. 1972: 200) or issue as it may arise diffusely in our shared life, for example, 
in connection with the punishment of students.  
To return, then, to the overarching argument, Winch’s thinking can, once again, 
be treated as congruent with negative responses to the question whether it even makes 
sense to suppose that social science could be otherwise than ethically committed. Based 
on what we have seen, it is not possible to distil a social science that is removed from 
the moral fabric of social life. 
Yet, once again, caution is required. There is considerable distance between 
taking the failure of purging operations to imply, on the one hand, that moral demands 




to be recommended. While strong enough as demonstrations against a neutral 
‘observation language’ or a practice completely insulated from morality, impossibility 
arguments have been usually interpreted as directly and inescapably leading to the 
specific forms of ethical and political commitment that various authors wish to insist 
on for the social sciences. The connection is natural but, I submit, too quick, and I think 
Winch would agree. For example, the mere fact that social scientists share in a language 
which is morally resonant does not by itself remove the meaningfulness of distinctions 
between being dispassionate or thoughtful and partisan or fanatical. Moreover, although 
it might not be possible to say that a certain activity will be insulated from a particular 
demand, not all moral demands are constitutive of that activity. The social sciences as 
an academic pursuit are constitutively intertwined not with every conceivable but with 
a specific set of basic moral commitments. As we will see, the demands of, e.g., 
intellectual honesty, sobriety in assessment and dispassionate fairness, far from being 
part of an underhanded attempt to evade moral commitment, are indeed moral demands 
and, in relation to academic life, constitutive ones at that. 
In light of these remarks, I will now turn to explicitly consider in what sense the 
idea of an ethically committed social science, in its root form, informs and is intended 
by contemporary projects. It will turn out that it not only extends far beyond the 
cautionary remit of impossibility arguments, but also ends up undermining many of the 
constitutive moral demands of academic life. 
 
What does the exhortation to ethical commitment mean? 
 
Typical proposals for an ethically and politically committed social science are offered 
as inescapably flowing from versions of impossibility arguments15 and, further, as 
easily eliciting assent because they are thought to express an obviously commendable 
position that no one, when given the choice, would wish to contradict. Part of the 
commendation derives from the absurdity of a person who would choose to be unjust, 
unreasonable or irresponsible as opposed to aiming towards their own and others’ 
enlightenment and emancipation (Geuss, 1981: 2). Another part, again hardly requiring 
justification, derives from the idea that in the face of pressing issues in the 
contemporary world, being committed is surely superior to being disinterested: why, 
for instance, would anyone choose to remain uncommitted when the mere fact of not 




change, war, social inequality or injustice (Collins, 2015), to name a few, is obviously 
a moral failing? 
Despite the implied self-evidence of all this, the matter is not straightforward at 
all. While there is no reason to deny that being ethically unresponsive can be a moral 
failing, it is worth wondering what kind of moral failing can logically give rise to the 
exhortation to be ethically committed, and, especially, in what sense social scientists 
can follow this exhortation.  
Starting from what are untenable options, it seems difficult to conceive the 
exhortation as a response to an overall lack of ethical commitment that social scientists 
considered as individuals may have exhibited, at least not in comparison to anyone else: 
It is most reasonable to suppose that, as individuals, they are no different to any other 
group of people who may take a stance in relation to ethical matters as these crop up in 
their life. It would, after all, be rather implausible to claim that social scientists are 
particularly prone to be uncommitted in this sense on account of their character or the 
people they happen to be. Nor can the force of the claim be construed as concerning the 
idea that, apart from responses to their private issues, those individuals have no clear 
stance on public issues where there are ethical stakes, and ought to develop one. Once 
again, this would render them no different to anyone else; it would merely confirm their 
membership in civil society.16 And while it is conceivable that the call could be 
addressed to raising the overall level of ethical responsiveness within civil society, this 
tells us nothing about sociology’s role in this. 
Instead, the exhortation really has to do with the idea that social science, 
sociology in our case, should be designed to play a special part in ethical, in particular 
public and political issues (Burawoy, 2005). It should not be silent about them, in the 
sense, for example, in which solid state physics is silent about the injustices of the penal 
system, but rather consider them as issues on which it ought to be highly relevant and, 
indeed, vocal. Naturally, I do not mean to imply that the commitment of sociology is 
separate from the commitment of sociologists. Those who are to assume and, further, 
express its position are in fact sociologists. Yet they are not to do so as individuals, that 
is, on account of certain independent aspects of their lives, but, rather, as members of a 
discipline who derive their commitment precisely from their disciplinary participation 
and whatever that is thought as being capable of affording (Burawoy, 2014).17  
Commitment through membership leads to a further aspect of the idea of an 




be unanimity amongst members. In other words, the point of the exhortation cannot be 
to encourage varied participation in public affairs where what is thought to matter is 
that one participates in seriousness, much like it matters that one votes responsibly, as 
it were. The idea is not that social scientists will just exercise their voting rights, without 
it being of concern whether some have voted, say, for the left and others for the right 
or, to return to Gaita’s example, that all teachers will become involved in the issue 
regardless whether some will say that the possibility of a child experiencing humiliation 
is to be avoided while others that it will prove a useful character-building experience. 
Instead, there is the implication that social scientists will vote the same way by virtue 
of the fact that they derive their commitment from the discipline. Furthermore, it is 
presupposed that, at least most of the time, which position is to be favoured is not left 
open to be decided after deliberation; rather, the issue is settled in advance.18 For 
instance, the vote is to be given to the left; the conundrum the teachers are faced with 
is best seen as a case of children being exposed to humiliation which, thus, ought to be 
prevented.  
Based on the above, then, the idea of an ethically committed social science may 
be unpacked as most fundamentally involving the following elements: social scientists 
1. being committed in their capacity as members of a discipline, 2. standing  
unanimously by virtue of that membership, 3. in support of a position with a specific 
ethical and political identity. These three features, as already hinted at, work within the 
understanding that ethical commitment is accompanied by a measure of effectiveness 
(see Geuss, 1981). The idea is that it is not merely important to heed ethical demands 
for their own sake, as far as one’s conscience is concerned or before one’s peers —by 
Winch’s lights not a bad audience at all (cf. Phillips, 1997: 289; Winch, 1996: 20)— 
but because doing so is to bring about change, to make a practical difference.19 
 
A possible Winchian reply to the successor idea  
 
Having set out the conception of an ethically committed social science somewhat 
generally, what I hope to achieve in the remainder of this article is to consider in more 
detail each of its features. I will invoke Winch’s later work on ethics in order to deepen 
our understanding of their moral significance and expose some potential problems. 
 





What is it about disciplinary membership that is thought to result in (unanimous) ethical 
commitment? The question is anything but straightforward given disagreements as to 
how to conceive of the social sciences, which may, in turn, lead to further disagreements 
on what membership is exactly thought to afford. It pays to consider the several options 
available:  
A first response trades on thinking of social science disciplines as accumulated 
bodies of knowledge, in other words, as sets of findings which have been established 
to the satisfaction of a community, and which are conceived as including sets of ethical 
commitments. Yet, apart from unconvincingly placing such a body of knowledge 
beyond the fundamental disagreements that run deep in sociology, this picture seems to 
imply that ethical commitments are a matter of empirical knowledge, as though it were 
a case of sociology being capable of and concerned with demonstrating that a value is 
worth committing to. 
A second, no less natural response, is to think of what is afforded as various 
special means of finding things out. Under this conception a discipline provides its 
members with tools that furnish them with new powers and abilities or augment existing 
ones. This conception is most obviously appropriate to technical disciplines but, 
depending on how open we are on what is to count as an extension or augmentation of 
ability, it can be applied to the social sciences too. Yet, it is difficult to see what kind 
of ethical tools the social sciences are supposed to afford. More importantly, this view 
seems to take ethical commitment as a technical matter to be dealt by a set of experts 
when in fact, as argued, it is an omnipresent feature of human life whose performance 
could not hinge on the existence of specialist tools.  
A third response identifies disciplinary affordances as the particular skills that 
one is trained in. These may be thought of as those abilities necessary in the use of tools 
or perhaps as resembling techniques or methods themselves. Under this conception, 
moral skills are construed as specifically targeted for development or enhancement. But 
such a view is more closely suited to training under a regime of, say, religious 
asceticism rather than under a university curriculum. Moreover, it remains difficult to 
see ethical commitment as something possibly resulting from these skills, as such a 
view does not depart from the identified erroneous conception of morality as something 




In contrast to the above three conceptions, it seems to me much more 
appropriate to talk of disciplinary membership via the inclinations, sensibilities and 
commitments that are constitutive of a discipline through being presupposed but also 
nourished by its culture and its aims. In doing so it is important to acknowledge that, 
even though it might be difficult to support the thesis that ethical commitment stems 
from specialist knowledge, tools or skills, an academic community can still be the 
bearer and cultivator of certain commitments that enable the exploration of possibilities 
that may not have been open to one beforehand. 
In ‘Human Nature’ Winch discusses R.G. Collingwood’s autobiographical 
account of his encounter at a very young age with Kant’s moral philosophy. 
Collingwood describes this experience as a revelation, upon which he discovered his 
calling. Winch points out that Collingwood did not only discover philosophy but found 
out something about himself that day. Putting the point in this way is important because 
Winch wants to emphasise the relation between the type of responsive attitude that 
Collingwood exhibited and the object of that attitude.20 The relationship, he wants to 
say, is internal in that the responsive attitude is only specifiable through the object, the 
particular subject matter and problems Collingwood found himself responding to. In 
other words, Collingwood found out that his inclinations were or could be developed 
into philosophical ones, that he is the kind of person for whom21 philosophy’s problems 
and constitutive commitments have resonance, and he chose to pursue them further 
through participation in the discipline: ‘Just look at how important these questions are’ 
he might have said, much like someone being struck by the miraculous in nature might 
say looking at a blossom: ‘Just look at it opening out’ (Wittgenstein cited in Winch, 
1987: 148).  
In a previous section I referred to the constitutive ethical commitments of 
academic activities. To do justice to their variety in connection with social science 
disciplines one might point to, apart from general academic commitments, those that 
are part of disciplinary aims and assumptions and, even further, to the overall culture 
of a discipline as reflected in things like its concerns and worries. In sociology in the 
West, we might identify in this category a tendency to side with the underdog, or to 
worry about inequality and the oppressed, which is why most sociologists would vote 





There is no denying that these concerns are in many ways presupposed in the 
culture of the discipline and nourished by many of its activities. Yet, arguments for an 
ethically committed social science that prioritise these concerns fail to appreciate the 
extent to which such commitments may work against or, in the worst case, eclipse the 
no less ethical commitments that are distinctively constitutive of academic life. 
Winch discusses precisely this matter as part of his introduction and brief review 
of contributions to the highly relevant The Political Responsibility of Intellectuals 
(Maclean, Montefiore and Winch, 1990). In identifying themes running throughout the 
volume he notes, most centrally, the fact that partaking in and having ‘chosen a certain 
[intellectual] life’ commits one to particular values such as truth, honesty and integrity, 
which present a moral demand to be served and defended when under attack (1990: 13) 
and which, further, depend for their realization on certain cultural and institutional 
arrangements. Moreover, those same cultural and institutional arrangements demand to 
be defended when threatened, including by ‘socio-political forces’ (1990: 2). 
Importantly, Winch also notes that the constitutive values in question are not 
compatible with every other value under the sun and may, therefore, come into conflict 
with ‘a wider political, or quasi-political, responsibility’ (1990: 6).  
Returning to the question of commitment by the fact of membership, we might, 
thus, conclude that there is indeed such a thing, not because it is dictated by a set of 
findings, but because membership itself depends, among others, on a commitment to a 
set of values constitutive of disciplinary and, more generally, academic life. Typical 
arguments for an ethically committed social science fail to perceive the full importance 
of this fact and bypass the real issue, which is not whether it is possible or not to be 
uncommitted but exactly which constitutive moral demands one acknowledges as a 
member and how one is to respond in the face of potential conflicts arising between 
demands. 
 
The question of unanimity and its ethical limits 
 
Apart from being referenced in connection with the discovery that his sensibilities were 
distinctly philosophical, Collingwood makes a later appearance (Winch, 1997) as a full-
grown scholar who reports feeling alienated from some of his colleagues, something 
Winch and, I take it, most academics can relate to. It is indeed important to remember 




constitutive values are internally related with personal sensibilities might be taken as 
necessitating the idea that members of a discipline are to assume uniform positions. But 
a commitment to certain commonly held values does not preclude that further personal 
sensibilities will enter into how those values are seen to matter. Most importantly, a 
commitment to values is not identical with nor can it automatically result in the making 
of a decision or the taking of a position in a particular situation. In fact, there are ethical 
limits as regards the kind of unanimity that can be embraced, especially concerning 
specific issues and cases where there is conflict of values. 
 Winch preoccupied himself with the problem of what it might mean to find out 
for oneself what is the right thing to do. In ‘The Universalizability of Moral 
Judgements’ he positions this finding out between decisions, on the one hand, and 
propositions or descriptions of facts, on the other.22 Even in such descriptions, he 
argues, the ways in which we set out what the situation we find ourselves is like, 
includes much fuller reference to the people we are and our personal tendencies and 
inclinations: ‘If we want to express, in a given situation, how it strikes the agent, we 
cannot dispense with his inclination to come to a particular moral decision […] such 
dispositions as this have to be taken into account in applying the notion of  “exactly the 
same circumstances.”’ (1972: 169) In referring to this responsive attitude of the agent, 
Winch does so in a way transcending any commonly held disciplinary identity and 
whatever level of commonality there may be on account of a common culture of 
sensibility.23 One’s personality, biography and the way they have resolved to lead their 
life all enter into how they are struck by a situation and what it means for them that 
something is the right thing to do. The idea, then, that this process can be somehow 
overridden or presumed to be automatically carried out through a uniform commitment 
to particular values or principles is not only mistaken as an account of ethical life, but 
is also morally questionable because it leads to superficiality.  
Underlying this idea is arguably another, namely, the conception of morality as 
a set of principles whose function is to guide conduct towards some kind of summum 
bonum. Winch challenged this idea especially when seen to refer to a process that 
occurs in an unequivocal or uniform way. In ‘Moral Integrity’ he puts the point bluntly 
when he exclaims: ‘morality does not help overcome obstacles, if anything it puts those 
obstacles in front of us’ (1972: 172), meaning that if there were no moral demands then 
limits to one’s actions would be absent. The most important upshot of this observation, 




in cases where there are conflicting principles involved, does not possess an answer 
which can be worked out by reference to those same principles24 but may refer to further 
values and, ultimately, to the person, the way they are struck by the situation and the 
decision they can resolve to support. In cases of conflicting values and moral dilemmas 
there may be no room for the idea that there is a unanimously right decision to be taken 
(cf. 1987: 186-7) but, rather, several obstacles to be handled according to conscience. 
 
The question of partisanship 
 
We have seen that it is not possible to sustain the presumption that working out the right 
thing to do can be delegated to disciplinary resources,25 be they a corpus of knowledge, 
a set of tools or skills, or even the commonly held constitutive commitments. Pursuit 
of truth, intellectual honesty and integrity govern academic life in an open-ended way 
that leaves room for individuals to work out where they stand on a particular occasion 
or topic. Open-ended values work together and indeed may require on behalf of 
individuals, as Winch points throughout his work, an attitude of seriousness and 
reflectiveness when encountering complex situations where these values need to be 
coordinated with others and decisions made as to their force and range of application. 
 Things are radically different when social science is governed by commitment 
not to open-ended values but to particular positions: open-ended values themselves as 
well as the process of moral seriousness are both jeopardised. A case in point is an 
avowedly partisan social science which defines itself as morally virtuous against a set 
of enemies, abstract and concrete: neoliberalism (see Ferguson, 2010), anti-
abortionists, anti-immigrationists, conservatives, and even the 45th president of the 
United States (Fasenfest, 2021) are candidates here. However opposed one may be to 
what these positions or individuals stand for, basing social inquiry on commitment to a 
contrastive position which is held to occupy the moral high-ground (see Tsilipakos, 
2017) and to be self-evident is ethically questionable. 
In the context of controversy Winch saw adopting a difficulty-free position as 
an illusion. He argued that in serious engagement with complex situations there is a 
significant part to be accorded to the acknowledgement and consideration of the 






One way in which a man may exhibit reason in the context of moral disputes is 
through understanding the moral positions of others opposed to his own, seeing 
the difficulties in them to be sure, but equally allowing them to highlight 
difficulties in his own position. There is absolutely no ground a priori for 
expecting that it will be possible to arrive at some position free of difficulties 
which everyone will be able to accept. (1987: 178) 
 
We might pause to observe that the fact that Winch employs the term ‘man’ generically 
bestows a different set of moral resonances to his statement when read in the present. 
It is worth pointing out that this is a facet of the complexity of the issue of a morally 
resonant vocabulary which has been raised previously. Yet, the point Winch is trying 
to make about, we might say, human beings, stands. Apart from blinding one to the 
deficiencies of their own position and leading one away from moral seriousness, 
partisanship works against the open-ended values that are constitutive of academic life. 
For one, Winch spoke in ISS (2008: 95-6) of philosophy, and the point could be readily 
extended to the social sciences, as constitutively ‘uncommitted inquiry’ in the sense 
that it is not to take sides in debates, e.g., between science and religion so as to award 
‘the key to reality’ to either, but is rather to concern itself with elucidating as best it can 
the different ways, including its own, of making reality intelligible. Moreover, we have 
already considered the demand of doing justice to how someone describes their actions 
and situation, which is particularly important for the social sciences.26 Bearing in mind 
the significant range of difference within social life, partisanship stands firmly in the 
way of responding to this demand. 
To reiterate, then, being uncommitted in one’s inquiry and doing justice to 
people’s description and understanding of their actions are not ways of pretending to 
be removed from moral demands but are themselves such demands, ones that work 
together with the values of intellectual honesty and the requisite reflectiveness and 
seriousness.  
 
Conclusion: Winch and the history of sociological debates 
 
Having travelled over a large expanse of ideas, it might be worth restating the entire 
argument as clearly and concisely as I can. To avoid possible confusion, I should 




defend. It goes like this: After breaking with positivist assumptions which per 
impossibile held facts and values to be separate, sociology has come to embrace, to a 
significant extent, a successor idea, understanding itself as necessarily ethically 
committed. There is, indeed, truth in this view but it all depends on what one 
understands by ‘ethically committed’ and, in particular, what kind of commitments are 
at stake. I have mustered materials from Winch in order to show how he may have 
handled this idea. With Winch, then, we can appreciate that there is indeed a generality 
to moral concerns, intertwined as they are with various activities, including social 
science, and that commitment to a morally resonant vocabulary that is used in social 
life is necessary for its accurate and just description. These insights, however, do not 
imply a further commitment to any specific moral vision, among the many that can be 
found within social life, nor do they bear the implication that social science’s non-
insulation from moral concerns constitutively binds it to just any of them. The idea of 
an ethically committed social science, as it is typically understood, moves abruptly from 
the fact of non-insulation, and implicitly, by way of disciplinary membership, to a 
unanimous commitment to specific ethico-political positions. Thinking with Winch, we 
can appreciate that uniform commitment to such positions is not only something 
different in kind to being governed by the open-ended constitutive demands of 
intellectual life, but that it also tends to work against these demands and, further, to 
jeopardise the moral seriousness required in dealing with ethical matters. 
 While there may be no exhaustive list of values that are constitutive of academic 
life I have maintained that truth, intellectual honesty and integrity are central. It need 
not be argued that they are absolutely supreme or that they may never be judged 
secondary to others. The fact remains that if they were to be systematically demoted or 
given up then academic life would not survive. 
By way of conclusion, I would like to reinforce what has been argued about the 
centrality of these moral concerns by explicitly indicating how they have been both 
recognised and debated in a few classical and contemporary instances of sociological 
debate (Burawoy, 2016; Gouldner, 1968; Weber in Owen and Strong, 2004).  
It has recently been reiterated by Burawoy (e.g. 2014) that it is a constitutive 
moral commitment for sociologists to speak against injustice, a prominent figure he 
cites being Pierre Bourdieu. Reflecting on this proposal, it seems to jar with the fact 
that some of the better-known public intellectuals who are as vocal against injustice as 




or claim to derive their commitments from their disciplines. And it has indeed been 
argued by no less a public figure than Sartre that an intellectual ‘qualifies as such by 
stepping outside the sphere of his or her professional activity’ (Sturrock, 1998: 6). Thus, 
no part of the argument put forth here implies that it is not possible that sociologists 
might intervene in public affairs or even become public intellectuals. Of course, the 
issue is not that at all; rather it is about how sociology is to think of itself, which in the 
past fifty years or so it has done in connection with public issue commitments. If taking 
a position on public issues is a moral demand on sociologists then it needs to be 
evaluated side by side with the equally moral demand to consider seriously whether 
sociology is really a basis from which to speak against injustice (Tittle, 2004), whether 
there is such a thing as expertise in these matters (cf. Winch, 1990) and whether 
sociologists can lead by example or ‘have any right to claim to be “leaders” of any kind 
in matters of conduct’ (Weber in Owen and Strong, 2004: 25). 
Although advocating the inescapability of an ethically committed social 
science, in the sense in which that idea is typically understood, Gouldner (1968) was 
highly sensitive to the difficulties with the idea and the attending moral demands, which 
render it anything but inescapable. He perceived the problems with advocating for 
particular factions and their positions and recommended instead a pursuit of values, a 
point I have drawn on in this article. He also appreciated the constant struggle required 
in going beyond the ritualistic assertion of commitments and acknowledging conflicts 
(1968: 133), as well as the demands placed on how one’s opponents are to be handled, 
citing, for instance, the depiction of Persians in ancient Greek tragedies. A more recent 
example, we might add, is Hochschild’s upright handling of Trump supporters in 
Louisiana (2016). It is entirely possible, then, to avoid treating ethico-political 
commitments as indubitable truths and subjugating academic values to them. It is also 
entirely possible to strive to acknowledge ‘inconvenient facts’, something Weber 
described as an ‘ethical achievement’ (Owen and Strong, 2004: 20), to endeavour to 
obtain a sound picture of what academic life provides and what it can legitimately claim 
to do, while perhaps also pursuing ethico-political commitments through channels that 
are appropriate to them. 
Given the emphasis placed on impossibilities, it might be worth ending by 
reaffirming that it is indeed impossible to be morally neutral and a scholar. Truth, 
intellectual honesty and integrity are moral values that demand to be defended against 




demand to be defended against the potentially corrosive effect of political commitments 
which, somewhat ironically, are sometimes very well integrated with the bureaucratic 
institutional frameworks in place for the funding and evaluation of research.  
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1 I am by no means capable of discussing the entire range of social sciences. This article 
should be understood as focusing exclusively on sociology. 
2 In this regard, it is indicative that the annual meeting of the American Sociological 
Association in 2021 is themed ‘Emancipatory Sociology: Rising to the Du Boisian 
Challenge.’ 
3 To appreciate the appeal of ‘liberation’ to prospective and current students see Feagin, 
Vera and Ducey (2015). 
4 Consider Winch in ‘Text and Context’: ‘When I’m horrified at the way somebody is 
behaving, at his cruelty to another person, say, I may sometimes say to him ‘You can’t 
behave like that’ (which seems to assume that he does understand what he’s doing). But 
in some cases I may address him differently and ask ‘Don’t you understand what you’re 
doing?’ That is, I may take his indifference to what he is doing as itself a criterion for 
his not understanding the nature of what he is doing.’ (1987: 32).  
5 I am here using the terms ‘ethics’ and ‘morality’ interchangeably, especially in their 
adjectival and adverbial forms. Of course, one could and should distinguish between 
the two terms in various contexts, which would not, however, make a difference to the 
present argument. For one, Hegel famously distinguished in various ways between ‘the 
ethical life’ (Sittlichkeit) and ‘morality’ (Moralität). For another, ‘ethics’ names a field 
of philosophy that may be said to have morality as its subject matter. Moreover, ‘ethics’ 
may exclusively designate a set of rules of conduct a profession adheres to. On the other 
hand, it is a person’s morals that we may praise or at which we may wonder.  
6 Iris Murdoch lies at the background of Gaita’s manner of speaking of ‘knowing what 
a word means’ and ‘deepening’ moral understanding. In ‘The Idea of Perfection’, 
originally published in 1964, she writes: ‘There are two senses of “knowing what a 
word means,” one connected with ordinary language and the other very much less so. 
Knowledge of a value concept is something to be understood, as it were, in depth and 
not in terms of switching on to some given impersonal network […] We do not simply 
through being rational and knowing ordinary language, “know” the meaning of all 
necessary moral words. We may have to learn the meaning; and since we are human 
historical individuals the movement of understanding is onward into increased privacy, 
in the direction of the ideal limit, and not back towards a genesis in the rulings of an 
impersonal language.’ (1985[1970]: 29). 
7 Concepts which are conceived by some philosophers as having a descriptive and an 
evaluative part are called ‘thick’ moral concepts (e.g. Williams, 2006[1985]: 129 ff.). 
The idea that only some concepts are like that has been used in the context of moral 
philosophy to delimit its subject matter by attempting to identify a distinctly ‘moral 
vocabulary’. The Wittgensteinian tradition Winch is part of, however, does not find any 





Duncan Richter points out (2000: 45) with the use of a powerful example from an 
unpublished paper by Cora Diamond, who herself illuminatingly discusses ethics as not 
a particular subject matter but an attitude, a dimension that may crop up (1991: 9ff.). 
But see De Mesel (2015). 
8 I have argued elsewhere that the appeal to art is not something that can be turned into 
a methodological recommendation for social science (Tsilipakos, 2018). As to the need 
to resort to extraordinary language, this is why Gaita seems to think, and possibly 
Winch in ISS, that Ordinary Language Philosophy (OLP) with its ‘what we would say 
whens’ does not quite deliver. For what it is worth I do not share Gaita’s views. I think 
he is being unfair to OLP in, first, misconstruing what ‘ordinary’ is actually contrasted 
with, second, overlooking the emphasis it places on points of logic in an extended sense, 
but not in terms of settling between competing normative conceptions and, third, 
underestimating the sensitivity required to show the differences between concepts, such 
as being just, delicious or green, to refer to Pitkin’s examples (1972), for instance, in 
terms of the kinds of questions and challenges that can be raised and justifications 
offered: ‘You call that justice, delicious, green?’, ‘How is it justice when those people 
are wronged, but it completely lacks salt, can’t you see those red hues?’. 
9 There is a difference, not always sharp but a difference nonetheless, between being 
able to register a moral vision and being oneself committed to it. The idea that personal 
commitment may be necessary for understanding does indeed apply to some relatively 
extreme cases but cannot efface the meaningfulness of those distinctions. Winch 
himself was concerned with precisely the kinds of limits to understanding that are to be 
found even within our own culture in his ‘Can we Understand Ourselves’ (1997). Yet, 
one should bear in mind that understanding is not either entirely present or absent but 
rather something relative to various purposes. One can understand something well 
enough to consider it or to talk about it or want to learn more on it, to convey a sense 
of it to a third party or cite the words of those who participate in the activity with some 
understanding without necessarily subscribing to it or adopting the exact perspective. 
It is neither correct to say that this is never possible nor to say that this is always possible 
– conveying what one considers an unthinkable position in intelligible terms might, on 
occasion, not be possible but this is hardly something general enough to be considered 
as a governing principle of social science. 
10 A.R. Louch, who initially reviewed ISS (1963; 1965) and engaged in a critical 
exchange with Winch (1964a), puts forth a thesis in his own monograph which is 
arguably very close in spirit to Winch’s. He wonders how human action is to be 
described if not in the morally sensitive ways that open it up to detail and appraisal and 
proceeds to claim that ‘what is needed, in both psychology and ethics, is not 
measurement, experiment, prediction and formal argument, but appraisal, detailed 
description, reflection and rhetoric […] Psychology and social science are moral 
sciences; ethics and the study of human action are one’ (1967: 234-5). There is some 
irony in the fact that the same scholar who criticized Winch for running philosophy and 
the social sciences together (ibid.: 174 ff.) so bluntly asserts the unity of philosophical 
ethics and the study of human action. In that respect, Louch and Winch are mostly in 
agreement. 
11 The culprit might be identified as lack of alertness about the limits of some of 
Wittgenstein’s ways of speaking. But it might be worth noting as a matter of scholarly 
interest that some of Winch’s formulations in question are also very close to Michael 
Oakeshott’s. Consider what Oakeshott says in his 1950 essay ‘Rational Conduct’: ‘an 
activity as a whole (science, cooking, historical investigation, politics or poetry) cannot 





to be embraced in a single universe of activity’ (1991:122). Finally, we might include 
another observation made in Experience and its Modes where Oakeshott discusses 
ethical thought as ‘incapable of constituting itself as a self-determined, homogeneous 
world of its own’ (1985[1933]: 334). 
12 Winch (1990) refers to Rhees who emphasises precisely the range of interrelated 
activities that are necessary in order to give ‘an idea of a people with a definite sort of 
life. Do they have songs and dances and festivals, and do they have legends and stories? 
Are they horrified by certain sorts of crimes, and do they expose people to public 
ridicule?’ (1959: 184; cf. Mounce and Phillips, 1969: 77). Winch also took up the point 
throughout his own work emphasizing the ‘multiplicity of [institutions, traditions, forms 
of life] which interpenetrate each other both in society at large and also in the lives of 
particular individuals. This means that there is genuine room for individual decisions 
in questions of social policy: decisions about where one’s allegiances lie, what 
considerations one is going to take as most important, and so on’ (1974: 900). For 
another example, regarding science and religion, Winch stresses in ‘Darwin, Genesis 
and Contradiction’ that they are not isolated but ‘untidily tangled together, they react 
on each other, and, what is more, they may seem sometime to come into conflict’ (1987: 
132). A person can maintain a life of coherence but not because these activities are to 
be kept separate: one is vulnerable to criticism if they go out of their way to prevent 
‘the mingling of incense and nitrogen sulphide’, as Winch nicely phrases matters in 
‘Meaning and Religious Language’ (1987: 121). 
13 Compare Winch’s further remark in ‘Nature and Convention’ that ‘moral conceptions 
arise out of any common life between men and do not presuppose any particular forms 
of activity’ (1972: 59). 
14 Regarding the diffuseness and embeddedness, or ‘immanence’, of ethics there are 
interesting affinities between Winch and the school of ‘ordinary ethics’ in 
anthropology. Not surprisingly, both draw from Wittgenstein, and for ‘ordinary ethics’ 
scholars, from later thinkers in that tradition, such as Stanley Cavell and Cora Diamond. 
Key references to debates in ‘ordinary ethics’ can be found in the introduction by 
Sidnell, Meudec and Lambek to a recent special issue on ‘Ethical Immanence’, in 
Anthropological Theory 19(3). 
15 Which might well arise, for example, as corollaries to the idea that ‘knowledge is 
always socially situated’ (Harding, 2004: 7).. 
16 See Burawoy (2016) for the idea that civil society constitutes the source of value 
commitments for sociology. 
17 It is worth stating that it is not always possible to draw a sharp line between what one 
draws from one’s discipline, and what comes from other sources. 
18 For example, as can be seen in relation to a case I discuss elsewhere (Tsilipakos, 
2017), the idea of refuting public discourses, say, as to the possibly poor parenting 
qualities of the poor is prior to any appeal to evidence. 
19 Considerations of space preclude discussing this point here but let it be noted that it 
is symptomatic of a tendency to misconstrue the nature of the actual moral 
underpinnings of positions by subjugating them to what is external to them. 
20 In ‘Eine Einstellung Zur Seele’ Winch (1987) talks about how one approaches 
another human being through the relationship between attitude and soul which can be 
thought, without too much violence, as exhibiting a similar relationship. 
21 For this way of phrasing the point I am indebted to Lynette Reid, who studied under 
Winch. 
22 In that paper Winch tackles the logical character of moral judgements in connection 





of mere preference, drawing on Melville’s Billy Budd to argue against Sidgwick who 
speaks as if ‘who is making [a moral] judgement is of no logical interest’ (1972: 153).  
23 Raffnsøe-Møller notes a complementary aspect of this point: ‘the cultural and 
linguistic learning of moral practices presuppose some of the same kind of moral 
spontaneity in the individual that can also function as a disruptive force against 
culturally reproduced pictures of morality, and also as means of questioning the moral 
and cultural identities and directions of cultures and individuals.’ (1997: 350). 
24 Compare Mounce and Phillips: ‘If a man [sic] is confronted by a choice between 
telling the truth and helping a friend, the sense of his problem depends on there being 
principles […] Nevertheless, though the man’s problem is derived from these 
principles, the solution to his problem, the decision he eventually makes, cannot be so 
derived.’ (1969: 102). 
25 Winch ends ‘Moral Integrity’ by forcefully proclaiming: ‘But philosophy can no 
more show a man [sic] what he should attach importance to than geometry can show a 
man where he should stand.’ (1972: 191). 
26 Gouldner (1968) notes the incompatibility evinced in Becker (1967) between, on the 
one hand, the symbolic interactionist commitment to the actor’s perspective, itself an 
aspect tied to the value of doing justice to people’s understanding of their actions, and 
what is an implicit, as far as Gouldner is concerned, commitment to siding with the 
underdog; apart from the characterisation of ‘underdog’ as a relative one and thus 
varying by comparison, it implies an asymmetry in terms of doing injustice to those 
who may be considered overdogs. 
